The short essay trend rises: TSMC and Samsung tighten tape distribution in China, a panic that has been amplified
On November 16, new regulations by the U.S. BIS eliminated the "self-verification exemption" for overseas foundries on domestically produced advanced chips, requiring new orders to be approved item by item. This is the real starting point of this round of turmoil.
On November 19, a "short essay" listing the dependencies of domestic AI chip foundry companies circulated, turning the "licensing system" into a "one-size-fits-all" approach. A-share GPU design companies generally fell 10% to 20% intraday, while foundries bucked the trend and surged.
On the same day, Shanghai Securities News verified from multiple sources: Samsung did not have a "strict investigation into contract manufacturing" documents, and the rumors were inaccurate; 14/16nm orders have high approval certainty, while 5nm and below are approved on a case-by-case basis.
The core of market pricing is not the truth of rumors, but a fact that was previously underpriced: domestic AI chips are "localized in design, but manufacturing hasn't yet been."
The origin of a "short essay."
The source of this controversy is not a rumor, but a provisional final rule issued on November 16 by the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)—"Responding to Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors," scheduled to be published in the Federal Register on November 19, officially taking effect, with a 90-day transition period for existing data centers.
The rules do three things.
First, blocking the "remoteization" of computing power: overseas data centers providing computing power with a cumulative TPP of over 12 million units to companies headquartered or ultimately based in China or other D:5 countries such as China and Macau must apply for permission.
Second, blocking "third-country transit" into the "third-country transit" system: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil are included in licensing control.
Third—and truly game-changing—for FinFET advanced logic chips at 16/14nm and below, overseas wafer fabs and packaging and testing factories can no longer rely on "transistor count self-verification" to overturn controlled presumptions. Chinese design companies must be included in the BIS "Approved IC Designer" list before foundries can accept orders.
In the last two trading days before the rules took effect, the market reacted lukewarmly to the first two measures, and the third was not immediately fully priced in. On November 17, China's Ministry of Commerce described the move as "a typical example of economic coercion and long-arm jurisdiction," and said it would take countermeasures.
On the evening of the 18th, a saying began circulating in investment circles: "Samsung has started to crack down on Chinese chip design companies and strictly investigate foundries." This statement has no documents, no company name, no source of information. But because it aligns with the new BIS regulations on "tightening the presumption rules for foundry," it was repeatedly reposted in group chats and was tacitly accepted as true.
Two other events that night added fuel to the panic. NVIDIA's interim CEO confirmed during the earnings call that the H200 would be discontinued, stating that the outlook "does not include any Hopper data center products approved for sale in China."
Tencent confirmed during its Q3 earnings call that "after the latest tightening, actual available computing power has decreased, affecting both leasing and self-built projects, putting pressure on training"—while also stating, "Cloud business computing power can run on domestic chips, but long-term restrictions will actually accelerate domestic supply chain construction."
Around the market opening on the 19th, a list labeled "It is understood that this matter is most likely true" circulated in a WeChat group. It lists the overseas foundry dependencies of major domestic AI chip design companies one by one, writing a vague but alarming conclusion for each one.
That afternoon, this list was recirculated by financial self-media under headlines such as "Squeezed Seven Inches," summarized as a phrase easier to share: "TSMC and Samsung restrict chip tape-out, which simply means not supplying domestic chip production capacity." "
The limit-down is the final stop in this transmission chain.
This is not a new story. In November 2024, at the request of the U.S. Department of Commerce, TSMC temporarily suspended supplying 7nm and more advanced processes to Chinese mainland AI/GPU customers, and Samsung followed suit.
In April 2025, rumors of "Samsung suspending all China operations" were publicly clarified by both companies; In the same month, the China Semiconductor Industry Association clarified that the origin of integrated circuits will be recognized as the location of the "wafer tape-out factory." This week, the U.S. Congressional USCC annual report again recommended extending controls to wafers, HBM, and packaging.
The scenario of "TSMC and Samsung joining forces to tighten" had already played out two years ago.
The response of the supply chain
The market responded to this list in the most direct way.
On the 19th, Suiyuan Technology hit the 20cm limit down and was sealed off, Shengke Communications fell 15.00%, Muxi fell 14.13%, Moore Threads fell 8.87%, Haiguang Information dropped 7.84%, and at one point dropped over 16% intraday; Hong Kong stocks Tianshu Zhixin fell more than 22%.
At the other end of the same industry chain, SMIC's A-shares rose 4.38%, Hua Hong Hongli increased 7.47%, JCET Technologies rose 3.95%, and Zhongwei Corporation rose 3.53%.
The funds have not left the main line of domestic computing power; they have simply shifted from "design" to "manufacturing."
On the same trading day when the limit-down was sealed, a media reporter consulted wafer foundries and chip design companies for verification, and the conclusions were far from the list:
"Samsung began to investigate and rigorously investigate the market rumors about contract manufacturing, which are inaccurate. Currently, Samsung does not have strict regulations or regulations on strict inspections of contract manufacturers; these market rumors originated from the November 16 update of the U.S. BIS's regulations...... Referring to TSMC's previous penetrative review rules and results, and considering that Chinese mainland also has 14nm/7nm process capabilities, Samsung's orders in this process area have passed BIS audits, indicating high certainty; Orders for 5nm and below may depend on chip size, usage, and other factors. "
In other words, Samsung has not issued any announcement to "completely halt OEM production for Chinese customers"; Mature process and non-high-performance computing chips are not restricted. The market has turned "license-based" transactions into a "one-size-fits-all" approach.
Several industry insiders told the media that BIS rules have just been updated, and the enforcement intensity and scale still need to be observed, "waiting for the company's actual application results." The Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs continued their stance from the 17th, calling it economic coercion and long-arm jurisdiction, and that China would take countermeasures.
Evidence and falsehood do not mean no harm. The real loss is structural: some domestic computing chip companies have indeed placed some advanced process orders on TSMC and Samsung, and the commercial certainty of this channel has systematically declined after the new regulations.
Panic is magnified, but the problems it points to are real.
Deduction: Repricing a narrow gap
The consensus among many market participants is that the sell-off on the 19th was different in nature from previous adjustments: the previous trading demand side (capital expenditure, data center pace) now hits the supply side directly.
The structural weakness of domestic GPUs is being exposed for the first time—the design is localized, but manufacturing hasn't yet been. The yield and capacity of advanced processes are still partially controlled by overseas foundries.
The cycle from tape-out to mass production and then to revenue recognition is measured in years. The 2027 revenue corresponds to current production scheduling decisions. If production scheduling is left unattended, some design companies' revenue realization over the next two years will be questionable.
The market is not targeting "AI direction," but "revenue visibility."
On the other side of the gap is a reassessment of the scarcity of domestic production capacity. After the failure of overseas alternative channels, advanced domestic computing chip capacity can only be concentrated in SMIC and Huahong Hongli.
This time, the demand side has already shifted. According to IDC data, in the first half of 2026, China will ship 2.008 million AI accelerators in data centers, with Nvidia's share dropping to 34% and Huawei rising to 28%, and domestic manufacturers' combined market share exceeding 50%; Non-GPU accelerator shipments grew nearly 80% year-on-year, surpassing GPUs for the first time.
The 2024 supply cutoff is driven by panic over "not being able to buy cards," and this time by worrying that "chips with scheduled production cannot be made"—the attack has shifted from end products to production.
But the surge in OEM production that day needs to be discounted. Order backflow is currently only an expectation; SMIC's 7nm capacity, yield, and expansion cycle are all limited. How many transfers it can handle and at what price remain unknown.
What rose that day was "the high price of the position," not the "high profit price."
Looking ahead, the trajectory of this controversy can be roughly divided into three layers.
The most likely aspect is the fulfillment of the new regulation's original intent—stricter licensing rather than supply cutoffs: new orders for advanced processes must be approved item-by-item by BIS, with high certainty of passing the 14/16nm segment. The real hang is on 5nm and below, with case-by-case approval and commercial near-shutdowns.
The second layer is that existing orders will continue to be produced and delivered according to the original contracts and licenses, with no immediate cancellations. Short-term report shocks are limited, with pressure on production scheduling and revenue guidance for the next fiscal year.
The least likely scenario is the version the market has been pricing these past two days: completely halting all Chinese customer contract manufacturing, including mature processes. Samsung still has a storage factory in Xi'an, and mature processes still have commercial benefits, which is basically impossible.
If the USCC recommends final legislation, the impact surface will spread to wafers, HBM, and packaging.
In this round of turmoil, the rule changes are real, and the panic is amplified as well. The market spent a day repricing the gap between "designing domestic products and manufacturing incomplete domestic products"—every time the blockade tightened, the value of the gap was revalued.
